The paper addresses the following question: how e cient is the market system in allocating resources if trade takes place at prices that are not necessarily competitive? Even though there are many partial answers to this question, an answer that stands comparison to the rigor by which the rst and second welfare theorems are derived is lacking. We rst prove a " F olk Theorem" on the generic suboptimality of equilibria at non-competitive prices. The more interesting problem is whether equilibria are constrained optimal, i.e. e cient relative to all allocations that are consistent with prices at which trade takes place. We give a necessary condition, called the separating property, for constrained optimality: each constrained household should be constrained on each constrained market. If the number of commodities is less than or equal to two, then this necessary condition is also su cient. In that case equilibria are constrained optimal. In all other cases, this necessary condition is typically not su cient and equilibria are generically constrained suboptimal.
Introduction
More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith described how the pursuit of self-interest can promote the interest of society. Since then, economists have devoted much of their time in providing rigorous foundations to this claim, which nally resulted in the rst and second fundamental welfare theorems. These theorems are valid only in idealized circumstances, among which the requirement that all trade takes place at competitive prices, including trade in contracts contingent on all imaginable future events.
The case where the assumption of complete nancial markets is relaxed has received much attention in the recent literature. When markets are incomplete, then a competitive equilibrium is typically suboptimal. The appropriate question to ask, however, is not whether competitive equilibria are optimal, but whether competitive allocations are optimal relative to the restrictions imposed by m a r k et incompleteness. When a fully informed central planner, who takes into account the implications of market incompleteness, is able to improve upon a competitive allocation, then competitive equilibria are said to be constrained suboptimal. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) show that competitive equilibria are typically constrained suboptimal, by s h o wing that Pareto improvements can be obtained by making the appropriate redistributions in households' initial asset portfolios and next restricting all trade in asset markets. More recently, similar results have b e e n obtained that show the possibility of generating Pareto improvements by i n troducing new nancial assets, see Cass and Citanna (1998) , or Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998) for a more general perspective, and the possibility of generating Pareto improvements by price regulation, see Dr eze and Gollier (1993) and Herings and Polemarchakis (1999) .
The assumption that all trade takes place at competitive prices has also been relaxed. During the last quarter of the 20th century, traditional Walrasian theory has accommodated in a general equilibrium setting the possibility of sluggish price adjustment, short-run price rigidities, and, as a consequence, non-clearing markets. For seminal contributions, see B enassy (1975) , Dr eze (1975) and Youn es (1975) . Attention has been focused on issues of equilibrium existence, and on explanations why prices and wages may not adjust freely to equate supply and demand. Instances of the latter are cases with information imperfectness, menu costs, renegotiation costs and so on. Many empirical studies show t h a t quantity constraints, like i n voluntary unemployment in the labor market, and infrequent price adjustments, like nominal wage rigidities, are common in the real world, see Romer (1996) . Other examples where the analysis of non-clearing markets is relevant are situations involving market power, planned economies and markets for agricultural products, see B enassy (1993) . More generally, application of standard tools from public choice theory shows that governments have incentives to intervene in the price formation process to gain votes, see Herings (1997) and Tuinstra (1998) .
Most economists share the strong conviction that imperfections in the price formation process, and in particular trade at non-competitive prices, has strongly negative w elfare consequences. Given the strength of this conviction, it is surprising that most of its foundations come from partial settings. No rigorous general results that stand comparison to the rst and second welfare theorems, or the constrained suboptimality results in the case of market incompleteness, are available. It is therefore that we label the claim on the detrimental e ects of trade at non-competitive prices as a Folk Theorem.
The paper addresses the following question: how e cient i s t h e m a r k et system in allocating resources when prices are not competitive. T o get an answer, we analyse the equilibria of the cleanest xed price model available, the one of Dr eze (1975) . In his seminal paper, Dr eze introduced the concept of quantity rationing in a general equilibrium model with price rigidities. In this approach a household chooses that commodity bundle which i s most preferred by it, subject to both the budget constraint and the quantity constraints on net trades. The quantity rationing may a ect either supply or demand of a commodity, b u t it never a ects both simultaneously to re ect the transparency of markets. The rst main result we s h o w is the Folk Theorem on the generically suboptimal allocation of resources when prices are non-competitive.
Inspired by the incomplete markets literature, we c o n tinue our investigation by analyzing a concept of constrained optimality, that takes into account the restrictions imposed by trading at false prices. Suppose that trade takes place at prices p and that an allocation is e cient relative t o t h e s e t o f p h ysically feasible allocations for which the net trades of all households have v alue zero at the price vector p: Such an allocation is said to be p-optimal. B ohm and M uller (1977) give an example of an economy, whose equilibria are not poptimal. Maskin and Tirole (1984) observe that if all traders have strictly positive w eights i n a w elfare program, then non-competitive p-optimal allocations involving trade in all markets are never voluntary, that is imply forced trade, and, therefore, are not equilibria. However, satiation or non-constrained maximization is typical for a xed price model, see
Aumann and Dr eze (1986), which implies that p-optimal allocations need not be solutions to welfare programs with strictly positive w eights. The question rises whether trade at non-competitive prices leads typically to constrained suboptimal allocations. A household is said to be constrained if it is subject to quantity rationing in at least one market. A market is said to be constrained if at least one household faces constraints in that market. We give a n e a s y t o v erify necessary condition for equilibria to be p-optimal: each constrained household should be constrained on each constrained market. If the number of commodities is less than or equal to two, then this necessary condition is also su cient. In that case equilibria are constrained optimal. This case is not entirely without interest as it is the general equilibrium equivalent of the partial equilibrium textbook picture that analyzes the e ects of a minimum or a maximum price on a single good. In cases with more than two goods, this necessary condition is not su cient and generic constrained suboptimality of equilibria is obtained.
The paper has been organized as follows. Section 2 exposes a model of an exchange economy where trade takes place at non-competitive prices. Section 3 shows that in such an economy, equilibria are typically suboptimal. Section 4 shows that in the two commodity case constrained optimality holds. Section 5 derives the necessary condition that all constrained households be constrained on each constrained market for constrained optimality to hold. It is shown that this criterion is typically not met when the number of commodities is greater than or equal to three. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The model
We consider an exchange economy denoted by E =< N L fX i u i w i g i2N > : Here N = f1 : : : N g is the set of households, indexed by i, a n d L = f0 1 : : : L g is the set To e v aluate the welfare consequence of trade at non-competitive prices, we x a price system p in P at which trade is supposed to take place. In general, since prices p might be not compatible with a competitive equilibrium, traders will face quantity constraints on supply and demand. The description of the market mechanism is now extended in the sense that the information transmitted by it is no longer only the price system, but also the maximal amount a household is able to supply of every commodity, called the rationing scheme on supply, and the maximal amount a household is able to demand of every commodity, called the rationing scheme on demand. In this we follow the approach and formulation of Dr eze (1975 The rst two conditions of the de nition are standard, they state that every household behaves optimally given the price system and the rationing scheme, and that all markets clear. Condition (iii) guarantees that markets are transparent. Constraints are on one side of the market at most. The requirement t h a t ( z z) b e l o n g t o I R L ; IR L + implies that there is no forced trading. Nothing precludes that the prices p are competitive. A competitive equilibrium is indeed a special case of a Dr eze equilibrium, i t i s a D r eze equilibrium without binding rationing.
Notice that the case with two commodities, L = 1 is the exact general equilibrium analogue of the standard textbook analysis of partial equilibrium, where, for instance, a minimum price is imposed in the market for commodity 1 which i s e x c hanged against commodity 0 : If at the minimum price supply exceeds demand, which is the case with the standard upward sloping supply curves and downward sloping demand curves, then the quantity actually traded is determined by the short side of the market, the total demand for commodity 1 : Some of the suppliers will be constrained. They are only able to supply part of their preferred supply. Now consider the general equilibrium set-up with L = 1 and suppose that at prices p total net supply exceeds total net demand. A Dr eze equilibrium will necessarily involve only rationing on the supply side, so z 1 equals a number su ciently large not to a ect the households' decision problems. Total net demand is not a ected by rationing on the supply side, so when z 1 is such that constrained net supply equals total net demand for commodity 1, the unique Dr eze equilibrium is obtained.
Suboptimality of equilibrium
Our rst aim is to prove t h e F olk Theorem that, given a tuple of utility functions u The interpretation of the lemma is very natural. The marginal rate of substitution between good l and the numeraire equals the price of good l if the household is unconstrained in market l: It is less than p l if the household is constrained on its supply in market l and it is greater than p l if the household is constrained on its demand in market l:
Dr eze equilibria may be optimal, for instance, if the initial allocation of resources is optimal. This is necessarily the case if there is just one commodity or just one household. But when the number of commodities and households is greater than one, we show this situation to be rather exceptional.
When L 2 and N 2 we can construct an example of an economy with an optimal Dr eze equilibrium at non-competitive prices p but an ine cient initial distribution of resources. Suppose that there are two households and three commodities, and competitive equilibrium prices p are such that the excess demand for commodity 2 is zero for both households, so only two goods are traded in non-zero amounts. Consider prices p such that p 2 < p 2 and p l = p l , l = 0 1: It is possible to choose utility functions such t h a t the demand for good 2 becomes positive for both households under the price system p: In fact, this is the natural case. Choose a rationing scheme (z z) with z 2 = 0 and other components of (z z) non-binding. Strict quasi-concavity of preferences implies that z 2 = 0 is binding in an optimal solution to the household's decision problem. But then the competitive allocation is a Dr eze equilibrium of the economy E at prices p which m e a n s t h a t the Dr eze equilibrium is optimal.
For L = 1 s u c h an example cannot be constructed. If L = 1 and the initial distribution of resources is ine cient, then a Dr eze equilibrium at non-competitive prices p is necessarily ine cient. Suppose L = 1 and let x be an optimal Dr eze equilibrium at non-competitive prices p of an economy E whereas the initial resources of E are distributed ine ciently.
There is at least one household i who is rationed, and at least one household i 0 , who is not. The former holds because p is non-competitive. The latter because trade is needed to go from an ine cient initial distribution of resources to an optimal allocation. Condition (iii) of De nition 2.1 implies that one side of the market of commodity 1 is unconstrained. By The following proposition gives a useful characterization of optimal Dr eze equilibria. It claims that each optimal Dr eze equilibrium coincides with a competitive equilibrium allocation. Proposition 3.3 A D r eze equilibrium x at prices p of an economy E for a rationing scheme (z z) is optimal if and only if x corresponds to a competitive equilibrium allocation.
Proof. Let It is immediate that a Dr eze equilibrium x which corresponds to a competitive equilibrium allocation, is optimal. We n o w show t h a t w e c a n c hoose the set of initial endowments of full Lebesgue measure for which all Dr eze equilibria are suboptimal to be open. Notice that the set of The theorem gives a rigorous statement o f t h e F olk Theorem on the generic suboptimality of equilibria at non-competitive prices. The next step is whether we c a n e v en strengthen this conclusion to generic constrained suboptimality. 4 Constrained optimality when L = 1 It is apparent that as long as prices are not competitive, full optimality i s t o o m uch t o be expected. The appropriate criterion in this case is the one of constrained optimality o r p-optimality, that is optimality relative to all allocations for which trades of all households have zero value at an admissible price system p. The notion of p-optimality w as introduced Here q = 0 corresponds to the full rationing on supply, q = 1 corresponds to the full rationing on demand, and when q = 1 =2 there is no rationing at all. It is immediate that z 1 (0) 0 andz 1 (1) Households on the short side of the market, the demand side in this case, are not rationed and get the most preferred consumption bundle they can reach under the given xed prices, households on the long side cannot improve without making some other household worse o . Therefore, a Dr eze equilibrium is p-optimal. A similar argument applies when e z 1 (1=2) > 0: 2
Without any doubt the case L = 1 is special. We think it has some importance, as it is the case that is typically analyzed in textbooks. In Section 3 we h a ve argued that optimality of equilibrium typically fails when L = 1 : More precisely, w e h a ve argued above 
Constrained suboptimality when L 2
If L is greater than or equal to 2 the situation becomes di erent. Then a Dr eze equilibrium is not necessarily p-optimal. Two c o u n ter-examples can be found in B ohm and M uller (1977) . Using a modi ed Edgeworth box diagram, they showed that equilibria and constrained optima constitute two disjoint sets. At the same time, robust examples of constrained optimal Dr eze equilibria can be easily found as well. Let p 2 P be a xed price system. To study the matter of constrained optimality, consider a \transformed" economyẼ with the same set of traders N as in the original economy E and the set of goodsL = Lnf0g: The economyẼ is derived from E by using the budget equality to eliminate commodity 0 : Initial endowments, consumption sets and utility functions of household i 2 N are speci ed as follows: The above allows us to formulate a necessary condition for a Dr eze equilibrium to be p-optimal. We call this condition the separating property.
Proposition 5.1 (Separating property)
I f a D r eze equilibrium is p-optimal, then every constrained household is constrained in every constrained market.
The separating property is quite powerful since it is stated in observable data only. Whenever there are two households that face constraints, but in di erent markets, constrained suboptimality is the case. The separating property i s a v ery strong requirement, so very stringent conditions are needed to achieve constrained optimality. Notice that in the example in Figure 1 , the separating property is satis ed.
The separating property is trivially satis ed if L = 1 or if there is only one constrained household. The rst case has been analyzed in Section 4, where it has been concluded that constrained optimality results in the case with two commodities.
The vector q is also called a vector of coupons prices in the literature, see Dr eze and M uller (1980) . Note the one to one correspondence between the side of rationing and the sign of a component of a coupons price vector for p-optimal Dr eze equilibria.
We already argued that the separating condition is strong, and if satis ed, only a necessary condition. The next result gives conditions for the separating condition to be su cient f o r p-optimality. Theorem 5.2 Any Dr eze equilibrium at prices p of an economy E with the number of constrained households or the number of constrained markets less than or equal to one, is p-optimal.
Proof. In the case where the number of constrained households or the number of constrained markets equals zero, the Dr eze equilibrium corresponds to a competitive equilibrium allocation, so optimality and therefore p-optimality follows.
Suppose the number of constrained households equals one. Then de ne i = 1 a n d q l = ; i l + i l l = 1 : : : L with i l i l the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the rationing constraints of the constrained household i: It follows that the condition for poptimality is satis ed.
Suppose the number of constrained markets equals one, say market l is constrained.
Then de ne i = ; i l + i l i 2 N and de ne q to be the l-th unit vector in I R L : Again, it follows that the condition for p-optimality is satis ed. 2
Our nal claim is that under weak conditions, the separating property i s t ypically not a su cient condition for constrained optimality. More precisely, D r eze equilibria for which the set of constrained households N C and the set of constrained markets L C consist of more than one element each, are generically not p-optimal. 
Thus, p-optimal Dr eze equilibria satisfy a system of n equations, where
Notice that a Dr eze equilibrium always leads to a solution to the system of equations. The other way around is not necessarily true, since non-binding inequality constraints have been omitted, and the de nition of Z r implies that a limited amount ( ") of forced trading is not excluded in a solution to the system of equations. which is at least one more than there are unknowns.
Let (w x z ) be the function de ned as the left-hand side of the equations (1) { (6). It is de ned on Q i2N X i Q i2N X i Z r IR N ++ M rs and takes its values in IR (N +1)(L+2)+jN C jjL C j;1 : The key element of the proof is the fact that is transversal to the origin, i.e. whenever (w x z ) = 0 its Jacobian is of full rank.
Suppose that there exists y 2 I R n such that y > @ (:) = 0 :
We write y = ( y 1 : : : y 6 ) where y 1 
2
The condition that the number of constrained markets is greater than or equal to two may be omitted from the statement of Theorem 5.3, since it is a generic property w h e n L > 1: The proof of this fact goes along the same lines as the proof of the theorem above.
Thus, we h a ve the following corollary. 
Conclusions
Notwithstanding the strong conviction of most economists that trade at non-competitive prices has detrimental welfare consequences, it is not based on foundations derived with equal rigor as the rst and second welfare theorems. This paper provides these foundations. We show that the Folk Theorem holds that equilibria are typically suboptimal when trade at non-competitive prices occurs. The more appropriate question to answer is whether equilibria are perhaps not even constrained optimal. In this paper we formalized the notion of constrained optimality as optimality among allocations where budget constraints of all households at the noncompetitive prices are met. A necessary condition for constrained optimality to prevail is the separability condition that all constrained households be constrained on all constrained markets. This condition is of interest in itself as it is formulated in terms that are observable. If the number of commodities is less than or equal to two, then this necessary condition is always satis ed. We s h o w t h a t i n t h i s c a s e i t i s a l s o a s u c i e n t condition, so constrained optimality holds in the two commodity case. When there are three or more commodities, then this su cient condition does typically not hold at equilibrium. As a consequence, even the stronger Folk Theorem, that equilibria are typically constrained suboptimal when trade at non-competitive prices occurs, is true as well under reasonable assumptions.
